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Berry and Goodrich: Political Defamation: Radio's Dilemma

POLITICAL DEFAMATION: RADIO'S DILEMMA
JOHN L. BERRY and WARREN M. GOODRICH*

The past quarter-century of American history has witnessed many
fundamental changes in our national life, among the most significant of
which has been the expansion and growth of the vigorous industry of
radio broadcasting. Within the span of a few years radio has assumed
a major role in the daily life of the average citizen, and, in a nation of
free speech and free elections, it is not surprising that the impact of radio
broadcasting on our political elections has been great. Reaching into
millions of homes as a highly persuasive medium, radio today probably
exceeds even the great newspaper industry in capacity for influencing
public opinion.
Congress, recognizing that, although radio properly conducted might
be a great boon to our democratic system, yet abused it would be a millstone, as early as 1927 took steps to insure the proper and impartial use
of the airwaves for political purposes. It provided, in the Radio Act 1 of
that year, that any radio station granting time to a political candidate
must grant equal time, under the same conditions, to all other candidates
for the same office. This insured equality of opportunity for the candidates, but it was foreseen by Congress that a partisan broadcaster might
censor a political speech in accordance with his particular views. To
obviate the possibility of this evil, a proviso was appended that radio
stations should have no right of censorship over political broadcasts.2
Although adequate to accomplish the two important goals considered
by Congress, the Radio Act nevertheless contained a dangerous and
unsatisfactory ambiguity as to the treatment of defamatory material that
quite conceivably might appear in a political broadcast: If the broadcaster
should require the deletion from a political speech of obviously actionable
matter, it might find its license revoked by the Federal Communications
Commission for violation of the prohibition against censorship; 3 if, on
the other hand, it should permit the candidate to make defamatory statements in the course of a political broadcast, the broadcaster would probably
'Radio Act of 1927, 44 STAT. 1162, §18.

'Ibid.
'See Note, 9 AiR L. REv. 381 (1938).
*This article was written while the authors were students of the University of
Florida Law School.
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find itself the unwilling defendant in a defamation suit in the state courts.
Carried over into the Communications Act of 19344 without clarification, these provisions still left to the radio stations the difficult
decision of whether to risk civil suit or industrial death.
The Federal Communications Commission was confronted with this
precise problem for the first time in the recent case of In re Application of
Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (WHLS). 5 A Michigan broadcasting company granted free radio time to a city commissioner, an announced candidate for re-election, for the limited purpose of discussing a proposed bond
issue. Following the broadcast an announcement was made that anyone
wishing to present an opposing view on the bond issue would be given
equal time without charge, but this offer was not accepted. A short time
thereafter the same commissioner entered into a contract with the station
for a series of paid political broadcasts in behalf of his candidacy. On
receiving the script for the first broadcast the company, considering the
content of the speech defamatory, refused to carry the program, canceled
the series of proposed broadcasts, and also canceled contracts with other
candidates for the same office. Two of the candidates filed a complaint
with the Federal Communications Commission, asking that the Port Huron
station's license be revoked or renewal refused for this alleged violation
of the Communications Act. On a hearing of the application for renewal
of the station's license the Commission held that Station WHLS had violated Section 315 of the Communications Act, that the prohobition against
censorship of political broadcasts contained in that section was absolute,
and that the broadcaster would not have been liable for the defamatory
material in a state court, since the Federal Government had so occupied
the field of radio broadcasting that state law would be superseded by the
conflicting federal policy. The Commission nevertheless granted the
license renewal, pointing out that the law had thereunto been ambiguous,
and that there was no showing that the station had intentionally violated
the law.
Inasmuch as the granting of the license renewal rendered the Commission's views, if not dictum, at least closely akin thereto, the import of
this decision remained in doubt until The Houston Post Company, operator of Station KPRC in Houston, Texas, conceiving that the Commission's action had established an erroneous rule of conduct to which it would
be held in the future, instituted before a three-judge federal district
'48 STAT. 1088, 47 U. S. C. §315 (1934).

'FCC Doc. No 6987, File No. B 2-R-976 (June 28, 1948).
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court an action to annul the Commission's order 6 under the provisions of
Section 402(a) of the Communications Act. 7 The federal court, in a
yet-unreported decision, dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on
the ground that the decision complained of was not an "order" within
the meaning of the Act. The Federal Communications Commission appeared by counsel and, on questioning by the court, stated it had not
intended by the Port Huron decision to impose a regulation having the
effect of law nor to add anything to the substance of Section 315. The
court concluded that the Commission was merely expressing its opinion
as to the meaning of Section 315 in accordance with the view which they
thought Congress should adopt.
This decision by the federal court, perfectly valid from the standpoint
of administrative law,8 nevertheless leaves the radio industry in an unenviable position. Although the Commission's action does not amount
to a binding rule, it dearly indicates that the Commission's view as to the
meaning of the law is such that if a broadcaster should in the future require
deletion of defamatory material from political broadcasts, its license would
probably be revoked. Judicial action could then be instituted to annul
such an order,9 but, should the United States Supreme Court ultimately
uphold the Commission, the result of an incorrect guess as to the law would
be fatal to the station. Meanwhile, there is reason to suppose that the
state courts will not accept the Commission's views short of Congressional
action or a decision by the Supreme Court.' 0 The federal court itself
in the Houston Post case indicated by way of dictum that it considered
the Commission's position unsupported by authority, and in fadt contrary
to the tenor of judicial decisions. 1"
Forced to chart a course between the Scylla of license revocation by
'Houston Post Co. v. United States, Civ. Action No. 4367 (D. C. S. D. Tex.,
Aug. 3, 1948).
'48 STAT. 1093, 47 U. S. C. §402(a) (1934).
Vom BAUER, FEDERmAL AnMuIsTRATivE LAW §195 et seq. (1942).
048 STAT. 1093, 47 U. S. C. §402(a) (1934).
"0The State of Texas, for example, filed a brief as amicus curiae in the Houston
Post case, contending that the Commission's decision would subject radio stations
to defamation suits in Texas courts.
State statutes should be held superseded by act of Congress only when the intention to do so is clearly manifested: Illinois Central R. R. v. State Public Utilities
Comm'n, 245 U. S.493, 38 Sup. Ct. 170, 62 L. Ed. 425 (1918); Bethlehem Steel Co.
v. New York Labor Rel. Bd., 330 U. S.767, 67 Sup. Ct. 1026, 91 L. Ed. 1234 (1947).
"Houston Post Co. v. United States, Civ. Action No. 4367 at 10 (D. C. S. D. Tex.,
Aug. 3, 1948).
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the Commission, should they censor a political broadcast for defamatory
material, and the Charybdis of ruinous defamation suits in the state
courts should they carry, uncensored, defamatory political speeches, one
of the nation's most potent vehicles for political expression finds itself, in
an election year, in one of the most anomalous legal dilemmas of our
time.
I.

THE NATURE or DEFAMATION BY RADIO

The whole field of radio defamation has been the subject of numerous
conflicting decisions and has occasioned considerable dispute among
writers on the subject. The courts have found difficulty in adapting the
problems of this new instrumentality to the traditional rules of libel and
slander, and the authorities have failed to agree on the proper basis for
the liability of the broadcaster that makes possible the publication of
defamatory statements. The principles to be drawn from the cases and
the views of the law-review writers are summarized here as a background
for the consideration of the difficult and narrower question of political
defamation by radio.
Persons Liable
The first problem in defamation by radio is that of who may be held
liable for a defamatory statement broadcast over the air. It is clear that
the person who speaks or reads the defamatory material is, unless privileged, liable for the harm occasioned to another's reputation.]2 If the
speaker is the agent of another, such as a commercial sponsor or the
station itself, the principal is liable if the words were spoken by the agent
while acting within the scope of his authority. 1 3 The possibility that
the speaker may be financially irresponsible has usually led defamed
persons to direct their suits, however, against the broadcaster for its part
in the publication of the injurious remarks. Although there is disagreement as to the basis of the liability and as to the rules by which the
liability is to be measured, the broadcaster is usually held liable for
defamatory material broadcast through its facilities." even though the
''2 SocoLow, Tuia LAW OF Roio BRO,\DCSIIG 85 (10O)
"RId. at 856-857.
"Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neh -48, 243 N W S2 (1932); Miles v Wasmer. 17'
Wash 466. 20 P 2d 847 (1933).
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remark occurs during the course of a network program over which the
broadcaster has little or no control. 15
The Basis of Liability: Negligence or Defamation
The second problem arising in radio defamation is whether the broadcaster's liability is to be grounded on the law of defamation or of negligence. 16 The general rule applicable to publishers-that is communicators
-of defamatory matter is that they are liable regardless of whether they
intended to publish a defamatory remark or of whether there was any
negligence on their part in failing to realize that the matter would be
defamatory.' 7 So long as the publisher intended the statement to be
communicated to a third person, or reasonably should have known that
publication would result from his acts, he is liable for the resulting harm,
if in fact the matter published is defamatory.' 8 In the law of negligence,
on the other hand, liability for an act which unintentionally injures another follows only in the event due care has not been exercised.' 9 It is
apparent that if the broadcaster's liability for defamatory material is to
be based on the law of defamation, the broadcaster will be subjected to
a stricter rule of conduct than if its liability is to be governed by the
standard of care expected of the omnipresent Reasonable Man: a remark
intentionally broadcast but unintentionally and non-negligently amounting
to defamation would carry liability under the strict rule of defamation,
while under the law of negligence the broadcaster would be absolved.
It has long been held that newspapers are liable absolutely for any defamatory material they print, even in the absence of any negligence on their
part. 20 Arguing that radio transmission is not an automatic process,
"Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
"See Vold, The Basis for Defamation by Radio, 19 MiNN. L. REv. 611 (1935);
Note, 33 VA. L. REv. 612 (1947).
"The Nitro Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524 (U. S. 1872); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§580 (1938); PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or TORTS 815 (1941).
"RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §577 comment k (1938).
"RESTATEMENT or TORTS §282 (1938).
"Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U. S. 290, 39 Sup. Ct. 488, 63 L. Ed. 987
(1919); Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup. Ct. 554, 53 L. Ed. 960 (1909);
Walker v. Bee-News Pub. Co., 122 Neb. 511, 240 N. W. 579 (1932); Laudati v.
Stea, 44 R. I. 303, 117 Atl. 422 (1922). Contra: Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177,
146 So. 234 (1933). In holding a newspaper publisher only to a standard of due
care in the publication of a libelous dispatch from a news service, Florida follows
a distinctly minority view.
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but rather that the broadcaster actively cooperates in the delivery of the
spoken words to the listener, and pointing out the serious injury to an
innocent person's reputation that may follow from a wide-spread defamatory broadcast, some writers have contended that the strict conduct
exacted of the newspaper publisher is the proper standard by which to
judge the liability of the broadcaster, 2 1 and the weight of judicial authority
is with this view. 2 2 In Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co.23 a federal
court carried this rule to its logical extreme. A Missouri station carried
a network-broadcast from New York, during the course of which an
employee of the New York sponsor falsely termed the plaintiff an exconvict. Even though the local station had no knowledge that the defamatory remarks would be made, and could not have prevented their utterance, it was nevertheless held liable.
It has been urged, on the other hand, that such a standard is unjust,
since radio broadcasting is in fact almost automatic and there is no practical interval between the speaking of the defamatory statement and the
receipt of it by the listening audience. Pointing to the more favored
position of telegraph 2 4 and telephone 2 5 companies and the news vendors, 2 6
against whom intent to defame or negligent conduct in that respect must
be proved, these writers contend that the more reasonable rule would
be to hold the broadcaster to a standard of due care.-; Although this
"1Newhouse, Defamation by Radio: A New Tort, 17 ORE. L. REV. 314 (1938);
Vold, Defamation by Radio, 19 MIw. L. REV.. 611 (1935); Void, Defamatory
Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts, 88 U. oF PA. L. REV. 249 (1-40).
"Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (\%. D. Mo. 1934);
Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932); Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash
466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933) ; cf. McDonald v. Polk, 346 Mo. 615. 142 S. W.2d 635.
Contra: Josephenson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 38 N. Y. S.2d 985 (1942) ;
Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
"8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934).
"O'Brien v. Western Union, 113 F.2d 539 (C. C. A. 1st 1940) (citing other cases).
"2 SocoLow, THE LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING §472 (1939).
"Street v. Johnson, 80 Wisc. 455, 50 N. W. 395 (1891); Emmens v. Pottle, 16
Q. B. D. 354 (1885); 2 RESTATEMENT Or TORTS §581, comment c (1938).
"Frank, The Application of the Law of Libel and Slander to Radio Broadcasting,
17 ORE. L. REV. 307 (1938); McDonald and Grimshaw, Radio Defamation, 9 Ant
L. REV. 328 (1938); Notes, 18 CoRe. L. REV. 124 (1933), 46 HARv. L. REV. 133 (1932),
18 IOWA L. REV. 98 (1932), 12 ORE. L. REV. 149 (1933); Comment, 28 GEo. L. REV.
278 (1939).
and for the negligence standard are sumThe arguments for absolute liability
marized in 39 Micn. L. REV. 1002 (1940-41). The Restatement of Torts does not
take-a stand on the question. Caveat to §577.
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seems a reasonable solution, at least as to network programs and ad lib.
remarks, to extend the rule to the ordinary broadcast, where an advance
script could have been required, might unjustly subject the individual to
grave damage from an irresponsible speaker unless the courts, in delineating the conduct of a "reasonable broadcaster," require considerable care
in the editing of script for defamatory remarks.
Still other writers have insisted that radio defamation should constitute
a new tort which would recognize the peculiarities of the broadcaster's
position. 2 8
Several states, including Florida, have statutes which resolve the
controversy. 2 9 By statute in Florida it is provided that a radio station
may require the submission of a script by the speaker twenty-four hours
in advance of the broadcast, the station thereafter being relieved of all
liability for any deviations from the script.3 0 Another Florida statute
enacts the rule of due care, providing that a broadcaster shall not be
liable for defamatory remarks published over its facilities by one other
than a licensee, operator, general agent, or employee, unless it is alleged
and proved that the station, its agents, or its employees have failed to
employ due care. 31
Libel or Slander
Cutting somewhat across the lines of analysis of radio defamation
according to the basis of the liability is the companion problem of whether
the rules of libel or slander are to be applied. The legal distinctions
between libel and slander are largely historical in origin32 and provide no
easy solution when novel means of defamation develop. Originating in
the Star Chamber as a criminal action, libel has traditionally been known

sMeyer, Radio Defamation: Neither Fish Nor Fowl, 2 THE LAwYER AN LAW
Nor 7 (1947-8); Newhouse, Defamation by Radio: A New Tort, 17 ORE. L. R v.
314 (1938); Note 33 VA. L. REv. 612 (1947); Comment, 12 ORE. L. REv. 149 (1933).
2"Iz. ANN. STAT., C.126, §4 (Smith-Hurd, 1935); Ihn. ANN. STAT. §2-518 (Burns
Supp. 1946); IowA CODE §659.5 (1946); MONT. REV. CODES §5694.1 (Darlington Supp.
1939); N. D. REv. CODE §12-2815 (1943); ORE. Cozs,. LAws AN. §23-437 (1940);
WASH. REV. STAT. An. §2424 (Remington 1932).
80FLA. STAT. 1941, §770.03.
"Florida Laws 1947, c. 23802, FLA. STAT. 1941, §770.04 (Supp. 1947).
82RESTATE ENT or TORTS §568, Historical Note (1938); see Notes, 39 MIcn. L.
REv. 1002 (1941), 33 VA. L. REv. 612 (1947).
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as defamation by written or printed word and has always been actionable
without proof of special damage, 3 3 while slander, usually said to be
defamation by spoken word, will not lie, except in special cases, 3 4 without
proof of special damage. 3 5 In rationalizing the historical distinction, courts
have frequently pointed to the greater deliberation involved in the printed
word and the greater harm possible through wide dissemination and perFaced with the necessity of choosing
petuation of the defamation. 36
between two rules which no longer adequately divide the field, most courts
have applied the rule of libel to radio defamation, allowing recovery without proof of special damage. 3 7 Some courts, however, have expressly
decided in favor of the more lenient rules of slander. 3 x Florida has
not passed on the question, and careful pleading would dictate that an
allegation of special damage be included in the declaration in a suit of
this nature, particularly in view of the fact that the Florida statutes requiring only due care could lead the court to interpret the legislative
intent as being one of encouraging the industry by leniency toward broadcasters in defamation suits.
II.

THE PORT HURON PROBLEM

Superimposed upon the generally unsatisfactory law of radio defamation, the dilemma of political defamation, which might now be termed
the Port Huron problem, is a direct result of the ambiguity of Section 315
39
of the Communications Act:
"If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally quah-

"See cases cited, CARSON, FLORIDA COMNIMON LAW PLEADING, PRACTICE kND PROCEDURE 222 (1940) ; PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TIE LAW OF TORTs 77 (1941).
"PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 789 (1941).
"McDonald v. Nugent, 122 Iowa 651, 98 N. W. 506 (1904), tlrooker v. Coffin,
5 Johns 188 (N. Y. 1809); Harman v. Delany, 2 Strange 898, 93 Enr,. Rep. 925 (1731)
(trade or profession); see, generally, PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF IILE I \W OF TORTS 79,
et seq. (1941).
"Note, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1002 (1941).
"Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F Supp. 889 (W D Mo. 1934),
Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932) ; Hartman v Winchell, 296 N. Y
296, 73 N. E.2d 30 (1947) ; cf. Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933)
"Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., Vict. L. R. 425 (1(C6) ; accord, Locke
v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N. V. Supp. 188 (1937) (distinguishable, however, as

an extemporaneous remark).
"48 STAT. 1088, 47 U. S. C. §315 (1934).
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fied candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station,
he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for
that office in the use of such broadcasting station, and the Commission shall make rules and regulations to carry this provision
into effect: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this
section. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to
allow the use of its station by any such candidate."
It certainly could not have been the Congressional intent, in adding the
proviso prohibiting censorship of political speeches, to force broadcasters
to choose between rejecting all political speeches or alternatively to broadcast and be liable for all material no matter how outrageous. Only two
reasonable constructions appear possible: either Congress intended, as the
Communications Commission opined in the Port Huron case,4 0 to absolve
broadcasters from liability for political defamation, leaving the defamed
citizen to his questionable remedy against the speaker, or, on the other
hand, Congress intended that the prohibition against censorship should
not prevent the suppression of defamatory material. The legislative history
of the Act reveals that amendments clearly stating both of these positions
have been offered but always rejected, Congress consistently refusing to
clarify the section. 41
Occupation of the Field by Federal Authority
In reaching the conclusion that broadcasters are not liable in the
state courts for political defamation, the Commission in the Port Huron
case concluded that the Federal Government had so occupied the field
that the state laws must bow to federal policy. As authority for this
statement the Commission relied on Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric
Co., 4 2 and O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Ca.43 The Sola case,
"it re Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (WHLS), F. C. C. Doc. No. 6987,
No. B. 2-R-976, p. 5 (1948).
4167 CONG. REc. 12503 (1926) (amendment granting immunity from suits in
courts); 89 CoNG. Ra-c. 1469 (1943) (authority to delete libelous material); see
Hearings-before Senate Committee on L C. C. on H. R. 7716, 72nd Cong., 2d
(1932); Hearingsbefore Senate Committee on I. C. C. on S. 2910, 73rd Cong., 2d
(1934) ; H. R. REP. Nos. 9229, 9230, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
1'317 U. S. 173, 63 Sup. Ct. 172, 87 L. Ed. 165 (1942).
'3113 F.2d 539 (C. C. A. Ist 1940).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

File
state
also,
Seas.
Sess.

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
involving patent and anti-trust laws, laid down the sound principle that,
notwithstanding Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 4 4 state laws would not be
allowed to contravene federal policy
". . in those areas of judicial decision within which the policy of
the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal
relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal
law having its source in those statutes, rather than by local law."' 45
This principle applies, however, only when there has been an occupation
of the field; the case offers little assistance in deciding when and to
what extent federal laws have dominated a given field. The Sola case,
therefore, can hardly determine the question at hand.
The O'Brien case is of more assistance. In that case a libelous
telegram was transmitted over defendant telegraph company's facilities.
In applying the rule of due care for telegraph companies in defamation
cases, the court announced it would not be bound by local state law:
"Congress having occupied the field by enacting a fairly comprehensive scheme of regulation, it seems clear that questions relating
to the duties, privileges, and liabilities of telegraph companies in
the transmission of interstate messages must be governed by uniform
46
federal rules."1
It was reasoned by analogy that in the radio field, too, federal policy must
prevail, and this would seem reasonable in view of the fact that both
radio and telegraph are regulated by the same act of Congress. 4 7 As
with most analogies, however, this appears less valid on close examination.
The case was before the circuit court of appeals on the question of whether
the court below erred in failing to rule as a matter of law that there was
no privilege to send the defamatory message. The ratio decidendi of the
case was that telegraph companies are to be held in the federal courts
to the more lenient standard of due care in the transmission of possibly
defamatory messages. It was in laying down this rule that the court
announced that it would not consider itself bound by state law. A tele"304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
"Sala Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173, 176, 63 Sup. Ct. 172, 174,
87 L. Ed. 165, 168 (1942).
"O'Brien
v. Western Union, 113 F.2d 539, 541 (C. C. A. 1st 1940).
"T Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1088, 47 U. S. C. §315 (1934).
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graph company is a common carrier, 48 bound to accept for transmission
lawful messages which are filed with it. 9 The O'Brien case simply holds
that with this obligation there is a corresponding conditional privilege that
will relieve the company of liability if a libelous message is transmitted,
providing there has been no negligence on its part.
A radio station, on the other hand, is not a common carrier 5 0 and
is generally not required to accept any material for broadcast. An occasion
for such an obligation arises, however, under Section 315 of the Communications Act when one political candidate has already been granted time.
It might be argued, then, that in this particular situation the radio station
assumes this characteristic of a common carrier and is thus entitled to the
accompanying privilege. But this reasoning would lead only to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the federal rule of strict liability, 5 ' the
standard of due care should be applied to radio stations during political
broadcasts. The analogy cannot be stretched to reach the conclusion
that there is no liability whatever, even for a negligent transmission. The
O'Briencase did not hold that a telegraph company is under a duty to transmit a message known to be libelous. It did, in fact, expressly recognize that
liability might ensue for such an act. 5 2 Both state and federal courts
have recognized the right of a telegraph company to refuse an obviously
libelous telegram. 5 3
Since the conclusion that the Federal Government has so occupied
the field of radio as to obviate liability for political defamation cannot
validly be drawn by analogy to the telegraph cases, the state decisions
and the legislative history of the Communications Act must be consulted.
The only case squarely in point that has yet been before a state
supreme court was Sorensen v. Wood, 5 4 which presented the other aspect
of the identical problem. Plaintiff sued the speaker and the broadcasting
company for defamatory remarks made in the course of a political broadcast. The station had not required the submission of an advance script.
'860 STAT. 1352, 47 U. S. C. §153(b).
'"See Tracy v. Southern Bell, 37 F. Supp. 829 (D. C. S. D. Fla. 1940).
"060 STAT. 1352, 47 U. S. C. §153(b); F. C. C. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U. S. 470, 60 Sup. Ct. 693, 84 L. Ed. 869 (1940).
"Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (1934).
"See O'Brien v. Western Union, 113 F.2d 539, 543 (C. C. A. 1st 1940).
"Nye v. Western Union, 104 Fed. 628 (C. C. D. Minn. 1900); Grisham v.
Western Union, 238 Mo. 480, 142 S. W. 271 (1911); see Von Meysenberg v. Western
Union, 54 F. Supp. 100 (S. D. Fla. 1944).
"123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932).
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From a decision in favor of the station, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Court of Nebraska. In answer to a plea by the broadcaster of privilege
under Section 315 of the Communications Act, the court said, in a decision
reversing and remanding:
".
We are of the opinion that the prohibition of censorship
of material broadcast over the radio station of a licensee merely
prevents the licensee from censoring the words as to their political
and partisan trend but does not give a licensee any privilege to join
and assist in the publication of a libel nor grant any immunity
from the consequences of such action. The federal radio act confers no privilege to broadcasting stations to publish defamatory
utterances."
The United States Supreme Court thereafter, in a memorandum decision.
dismissed an appeal by the station with the statement that the decision of
the Supreme Court of Nebraska was based on a non-federal ground adequate to support the judgment. 55 Of course, had there existed in fact a
privilege under the Radio Act, granted by Congress in the constitutional
exercise of its authority over interstate commerce, then to subject the
station to civil liability would have deprived it of property without due
process of law. The broadcaster, however, had not been held liable in
the lower state court, and the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court
merely rendered the radio station subject to possible liability in a new
trial. The broadcaster consequently was denied any standing to raise the
question of privilege under Section 315, and a flat decision on the problem
by the United States Supreme Court was avoided. The opinion, however,
contains at least a faint rejection of the theory of absolute prohibition of
censorship. The Sorensen case, a leading one on radio defamation, has
been frequently cited with approval by both state and federal courts,3 6
but always for the rule of absolute liability that it imposes on broadcasters
and not for its interpretation of Section 315.
The only other pertinent judicial pronouncement is that of an inter-

55
KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U. S. 599, 54 Sup. Ct. 209, 78 L. Ed.
527 6(1933).

" Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E. D. Wash. 1943); Coffey
v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934); Irwin v. Ashurst,
158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938); Miles v. Wasmer, 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847
(1933); Singler v. Journal Co., 218 Wis. 263, 260 N. W. 431 (1935); see McDonald
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mediate New York court. 57 In a case involving an ad lib. defamatory
remark in the course of a political broadcast, this court held that the
obligations of Section 315 necessarily carried a corresponding privilege to
broadcast defamatory matter. Since the court also announced that merely
the rule of due care would be applied to broadcasters, the force of the
decision as interpretative authority for Section 315 is considerably weakened, inasmuch as the due-care rule alone would have excused the radio
station for the ad lib. remark. 58 A later New York case 59 indicated by
way of dictum that censorship of a political speech for defamatory material
would be proper.
The legislative history of Section 315 offers little indication that the
interpretation preferred by the Commission represents the Congressional
will.6 0 If the Commission-favored view of a conditional privilege accompanied by an absolute prohibition on all censorship was intended, there
seems no reason why a clarifying amendment to that effect should not
have been approved. 6 1 Such a provision has, however, been consistently
rejected, 6 2 and doubts as to its constitutionality have been expressed in
Senate hearings. The Commission, it must be observed, was faced with
the task of divining the legislative intent of Congress when it appears that
Congress itself was, and still is, uncertain as to the purpose of the section.
Refusal by Congress to face in either direction has, of course, precipitated
the whole problem.
The ProhibitionAgainst Censorship
If the Federal Government has not granted to broadcasters immunity
from political defamation suits-and that it has is at least doubtful-the
conclusion follows within reason that the prohibition against censorship
of political speeches by radio stations is not absolute. The Commission,
in finding an uncompromising ban of the blue pencil, accepted the literal
wording of the Act; and it is true that this on its face seems definite
enough. But even in rendering this opinion, the Commission indicated
that it did not intend to hold that there was an obligation to broadcast
v. Polk, 346 Mo. 615, 142 S. W.2d 635 (1940).
"5Josephenson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 38 N. Y. S.2d 985 (1942).
"Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939).
"See Rose v. Brown, 58 N. Y. S.2d 654 (1945).

"See note 41 supra.
";Senator Fess, 67 CoNrG. Rac. 12503 (1926).

'"See note 41 supra.
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obscene matter or any other matter prohibited by federal law.6r3
To
require a candidate to delete an obscenity would certainly be an act of
censorship, and it could hardly be contended that the broadcaster would
not have this right. 6 4 Thus, there is in fact no absolute prohibition
against censorship. 65 Where the line is to be drawn is a matter of public
policy, and in view of the well-established rule that there is no obligation
on a telegraph or telephone company to transmit libelous or unlawful
messages, 66 it seems that until a clear Congressional pronouncement is
forthcoming the more reasonable conclusion is that defamatory material
is not protected from censorship by Section 315 of the Communications

Act. 6 7

III.

RESOLVING THE DILEMMA

Legislation
The only real solution of the problem of political defamation by radio
is that Congress properly shoulder its responsibility of clarifying the
ambiguous Section 315. This might be done in one of several ways.
Congress could specifically provide that radio stations complying with
"In re Port Huron Broadcasting Co. (WHLS), FCC Doc. No. 6987, File No.
B 2-R-976, p. 7 (1948).
5'48 STAT. 1091, 47 U. S. C. §326.
"5Other prohibited transmission which would be clearly subject to censorship,
even though broadcast by a political candidate: Lotteries, 48 STAT. 1088, 47 U.
S. C. §316 (1934); false distress signals, 48 STAT. 1091, 47 U. S. C. §325 (1934);
cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357; Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 62 Sup. Ct. 89, 86 L. Ed. 1031; N. L. R. B. v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, 62 Sup. Ct. 344, 86 L. Ed. 348; Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Standard Education Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692, modified on other grounds,
302 U. S. 112, 58 Sup. Ct. 365, 82 L. Ed. 602 (1937).
"8Von Weysenberg v. Western Union, 54 F. Supp. 100 (S. D. Fla. 1944); Tracy
v. Southern Bell, 37 F. Supp. 829 (S. D. Fla. 1940); Hamilton v. Western Union,
34 F. Supp. 928 (N. D. Ohio 1940).
"'As is validly pointed out by Commissioner Jones in a separate concurring
opinion in the Port Huron decision, the whole problem might have been avoided
in the case of WHLS's petition on the basis that there had been no violation of
Section 315, no candidate having spoken. Supporting this view is the very technically decided case of Weiss v. Los Angeles Broadcasting Company, 163 F.2d 313
(C. C. A. 9th 1947), which held that the censorship prohibition of Section 315 did
not come into operation until the second political speaker's speech is censored. This,
however, merely avoids the problem, for it may well happen that the next case will
involve the second speaker.
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Section 315 are immune to defamation suits growing out of political
broadcasts. In spite of legislative qualms as to constitutionality, 68 it
would seem, in a day of an elastic commerce clause, that such suits might
properly be prohibited as a burden on the interstate commerce of radio
broadcasting. 6 9 The social advisability of this course is, however, questionable. Balanced against the danger of indirect censorship of content
is the consideration to be given the personal right to enjoy one's good
reputation without irresponsible attack.
Alternatively, the Federal Government might enact legislation covering the whole field of radio defamation, including a clarification of Section
70
315; and this has been urged by law-review writers.
A compromise could be reached by Congressional enactment, similar
to the two Florida statutes, 71 designed to cover the special problem of
political defamation. The result would grant radio stations the right to
require scripts in advance of the political broadcast, to require the deletion of any defamatory material, and to be absolved thereafter from
liability if, in spite of due care on their part, a defamatory remark is
interpolated. Abuses by broadcasters of the limited right of censorship
could be prevented by a simple method of proceeding before the Commission to enforce punitive provisions, including license revocation, and by
giving to a candidate so imposed upon a civil action against the broad72
caster in the federal courts.
Interim Measures
Until Congress acts, the broadcasters have but two courses. First,
they can refuse all political broadcasts. Both because political broadcasts
"'Senator Fess, 67 CoxG. R c. 12503 (1926).

"Cf. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 63 Sup. Ct. 997,
87 L. Ed. 1344 (1943).
"'See particularly Keller, Federal Control of Defamation by Radio, 12 NoTm
DAmm LAw. 15 and 134 (1936-37).
1
"FLA. STAT. 1941, §770.03; Florida Laws 1947, c. 23802, FLA. STAT. 1941, §770.04

(Supp. 1947).
"That such an action will now lie is not clear. In Weiss v. Los Angeles Broadcasting Co., 6 F. R. D. 33 (S. D. Cal. 1946), a federal district court held that no civil
cause of action arose in favor of a candidate whose political broadcast had been censored.
On appeal, the circuit court of appeals held, 163 F.2d 313 (C. C. A. 9th 1947), that
the court had jurisdiction but that Section 315 had not been violated, since plaintiff
was the first political speaker and the prohibition arose only after one candidate
had spoken. The inference is that a cause of action might exist in a proper case.
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are remunerative, and because the broadcasters recognize their obligation
of public service, 73 most stations have been reluctant to follow this course.
Second, they can accept political broadcasts and protect themselves as
best they can by contract. It seems that the station could require the
posting of an adequate bond by all political speakers, 7 4 although this
would work to the inevitable disadvantage of candidates of limited means.
Since most candidates would not be eager to subject themselves to
defamation suits, it is probable that they would frequently accede to the
advice of the broadcaster's counsel to delete objectionable material, but
the problem is of such importance that the law should not be left to
fortuitous probabilities.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The law of radio defamation is presently in some confusion, although
the weight of authority is that defamation broadcast by radio is libel,
for which the broadcaster is absolutely liable. Florida and several other
states, however, hold the broadcaster to a standard of due care only.
One of the most unsatisfactory phases of the problem is that of
political defamation. It is not now clear whether, having allowed one
candidate for an office to speak, a broadcaster may censor the speech of
a second candidate for defamatory material. There is ample reason to
hold that there is a qualified right of censorship for such material,
although the Federal Communications Commission takes the opposite
view. Pending the enactment of much-needed federal legislation clarifying the confusion that Congress has thus far created in this field, the
broadcasters can merely seek to protect themselves by contract from
defamation suits in the state courts. The question is far from academic.
as it involves the welfare of one of our great public-service industries and
bears upon the vital institution of our political elections.

"48 STAT. 1085, 47 U. S. C. §309.
"See Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302
(1939).
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